Theory and Hypotheses We consider two sets of hypotheses. Ravi.. Tables 3 and Louis vuitton uk report the regression results. The labeling of frequent contribut ors plays a significant role for sustaining cooperation in the networks. Fehr and Gachter 2000b . we use the number of downloads requested in a given day as a control variable in our regression models. Available at ssrn abstract=926915. 8 Private Contribution to Public Goods Contribution to peer-to-peer networks resembles a typical cas e of private contribution to public goods. Xia. M. and N. Louis Vuitton UK individual characteristics Louis vuitton stay unchanged over time. It also shows that user-initiated social enforcement mechanisms could play a significant role in sustaining peer-to-peer networks. Some simple economics of open source. Interview with Linus Torvalds: What motivates free software developers? First Monday 3 3 . Wharton Working Paper. We infer their motivation from their behaviors. in particular. Telang. these experiments discover that individuals enforce social norms on each other. while individuals rarely have repeated one-to-one interactio ns in peer-to-peer networks. The discussion suggests that self-interests ma nifest as a moderating effect between wait time and download needs on individuals?? propensity for contribution. We also find that individuals with high download needs tend to increase their contribution probability when they face more network congestion. Information Systems Research 12 3 225-239. Network operators therefore need to take actions to encourage positive reciprocity in such networks. L. Shah. Smith. Kiesler. Panchanathan. but a person who fails to punish is in turn punished . enjoyment in helping others. While a significant number of users in these networks free ride on others?? 2 Such costs mainly manifest in the form of opportunity costs in stead of outright financial costs. References Alexander. which enable them to respond in kind to each other. UIUC Working Paper . In the context of music sharing networks. The experi ment shows that individuals have inherent incentive to contribute to public goods. Sloof. Peer-to-peer networks have increasingly become distribution and communication channels of digital files and a variety of mechanisms have been proposed to encourage file sharing and distribution. Fairness as a constraint on profit seeking: Entitlements in the market. Adil ov. laboratory experiments show that the responder frequently reciprocates and the amount reciprocated increas es with the original contribution from the proposer Fehr and Schmidt 1999 . Social exchange theory. a user??s reputation also influences her choice of server settings. and moreover.. We discuss the theo retical foundation of private contribution to public goods in the next section. and knowledge contribution in online communities. 2004. The resu lts indicate that indire ct reciprocity is a dynamic social force as individual behaviors are significantly influen Louis vuitton handbags uk by others?? behavior in a social network. To account for contribution out of self-interest. othe r drivers such as self-interest and altruism also motivate private contributions to peer-to-peer networks. Clark. M. New York. H2: In-kind Indirect Reciprocit y ?C a user??s probability of contribution is less influenced by the number of pure contributors than by th e number of mixed contributors in a peer-to-peer network. Figure 1 dup licates Figure 1b from Fehr and Gachter 2000b that provides a comparison of individual contribution levels with and without peer punishment mechanisms. M. and S. M. Fehr. 2007. Information Systems Research 18 1 42-67.L. Management Science 52 7 984-999. Moreover. 24 Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the key variables used in this paper. but also by Louis Vuitton Cheap characteristics . 2008 . while in a public goods game with peer punishment individuals?? contribution levels gradually increase to a higher equilibrium level. First. R. Kartik Hosanagar. By punishing or threatening to punish perpetrators who do not comply with social norms. particularly with number of observed contributors and free riders in the network. K. The fixed effect allows the models to focus on changes in individual contribution status and use of reward and punishment mechanisms. J. Figure 1 dup licates Figure 1b from Fehr and Gachter 2000b that provides a comparison of individual contribution levels with and without peer punishment mechanisms. We infer their motivation from their behaviors. References Alexander. P??nard. Contributor characteristics influence indirect reciprocity in two ways. 2002.. the contributi on level decreases over time and gradually approaches zero. 32 Faraj. 2001a. Johnson and Faraj 2005. Slaughter. 2005. 2004 . R. and S. As an individual gains experience with the network. free riders could flourish. Fehr and Gachter 2000b. 2008. We then develop hypotheses for the indirect reciprocity theory on private contribution to peer-to-peer networks. or in other forms. These studies provide insights into why individuals differ in their contribution levels. A. For example. Management Science 52 7 1000-1014. we do not know the process Louis Vuitton Outlet UK which social environment influences individuals. As the p eer-to-peer network studie d in this paper allows 14 contributors to punish free riders and reward contributors.. followed by a discussion of the empirical analysis and results. 2005. Therefore. contribution behaviors are reciprocal in nature. Ekeh. 1987. Leidner eds. C. An individual??s helpful action. Our analysis reveals that social environments have a significant influence on individual behavior. B. Lab experiments show that the ability for individuals to punish free riders and reward contributors has a significant impact on contribution to public goods. influence an indi vidual??s propensity to contribut e to the network. In a ddition. Sloof. The American Journal of Economics and Sociology 63 5 1193-1212. image score. G. 2005 subjective norm Bock et al. 2002. or pirated contents. As the p eer-to-peer network studie d in this paper allows 14 contributors to punish free riders and reward contributors. J. C. it increases the costs of deviation and encourages compliance. J. Management Information Systems Quarterly 28 1 21-43. and R. and S. Knowledge Management: An Evolutionary View of the Field. Susarla.A.. Therefore.. there are also a substantial number of contributors that consistently provide resources to such networks. Harvard Business School Working Paper. Francis 1985 reports that striking workers take actions to isolate strike breakers that cross the picket line. American Economic Review 90 4 980-994. and J. Nature 437 7063 1291-1298. M. Public goods: a survey of expe rimental research. Management Science 33 5 589?C609. We render this important question for future studies. The experi ment shows that individuals have inherent incentive to contribute to public goods. Gachter.
