Barcelona. H. social-psychological forces. An individual. 2004 find that 42% of users of Gnutella. Information Louis Vuitton UK Research 15 4 316-335 Raghu T. 2007. Xia. then a decrease in on e individual??s contribu tion would affect her neighbors. where contributions and benefits are pooled and shared. Slaughter. R. S. Fairness and the assumptions of economics. By studying how individuals change server settings with the social environment. In such cases. we find that the probability of providing preferential services decreases significantly with number of contributors in the network H7b . Chen. Hughes et Louis Vuitton Outlet S. Cooperation. Louis vuitton uk 2002. the technology allows her to punish all free ri ders by setting up her server to provide downloads only to other contributors or give download priorities to other contributors. L. we do not observe individuals?? motivation in making contribution to the peer-to-pe er networks. J. Moreover. R. A self-int erested responder is not expected to return anything to the proposer. overlooks the social nature of peer-to-peer networks where individual behavior is both influenced by social environment as well as a part of the social environment that affects others. Experience An important observation from experimental studies on public goods is that individuals reach equilibrium over time. but heavily influenced by the presence of contributors who also download from the network. S. H. Proceedings of National Academy of Science 102 7 2666-2670. It also shows that user-initiated social enforcement mechanisms could play a significant role in sustaining peer-to-peer networks. R. J. J. A. which in turn affects their neighbors. 2008. 1996. This is because the Internet has enabled increasing number of transactions among anonymous partners in electronic marketplaces. Espinosa. Management Science 49 3 464?C477. MacKie-Mason. We conduct the analysis using a panel data by observing 103. Journal of Business 59 4 S285?CS300. The difference indicates that content contribution to peer-to-p eer networks by itself does not create a conflict between self interest and collective interest as in a typical public good model. and J. Freeriding on gnutella revisited: the bell Tolls? IEEE Distributed Systems Online 6 6 1109-1140. Fischbacher. L. Greiner. The difference indicates that content contribution to peer-to-p eer networks by itself does not create a conflict between self interest and collective interest as in a typical public good model. 2003. Second.A. For example. Telang. Table 3 reports the social influence of indirect reciprocity on the individual c ontribution. We therefore hypothesize that an individual??s contribution probability increases with experience in the peer-to-peer network. complexity.. indicating the presence of direct reciprocity Henrich et al. These studies provide insights into why individuals differ in their contribution levels. career opportunities Hann et al. UIUC Working Paper . we consider our study complements to earlier studies that focus on identifying individual motivations but overlook th e dynamic nature of social networks. First. Management Science 52 7 Louis Vuitton while individuals rarely have repeated one-to-one interactio ns in peer-to-peer networks. The recognition of social networks as a dynamic environment also raises important questions about stability and viability of the network. They are willing to contribute as long as a significant number of others contribute and the amount of their contribution increases w ith the number of contributors in the network. S. otivation factors actually influe nce individual behavior in social networks. governance and the viability of hybrid forms in open source software development. Oosterbeek. The labeling transforms one-shot games into repeated games where cooperation can be sustained. The increase is consistent with the finding from economic experiments and Figure 1. Smith. A. However. Organization Science 7 2 119?C135. Our analysis also has louis vuitton outlet lights on individual motivations of enforcing social norms in social networks. e. on average. R. 2004. individuals in the networks will have less incen tive to reciprocate. Herbsleb. The new experiment reveals that individual contribution increases dramatically when peer punishment is enabled. G. Users that obtain a specific title from a peer-to-peer network are likely to be more concerned about the long-term sustai nability of the network as the valu e of their reputation depends on the survival of the network. Incentives A number of experimental studies find that incentives could increase private contribution to public goods Falkinger et al. We infer their motivation from their behaviors. how much. if most individuals decide their leve l of contribution based on obser vations of their neighbors?? contribution behavior.. In these networks.. Extant research suggests that individuals reciprocate negative actions with negative actions Panchanathan and Boyd 2004. peer-to- peer networks preclude direct reciprocity. Shah 2006. some contributors are undercover employees of viral ma rketing firms that intend to promote certain music groups or artists instead of benefiting the community. individuals are less likely to reciprocate to these contributors in kind. W. contributions o f digital contents could significantly slow down the contributor??s network connection and louis vuitton outlet or disrupt software applications that share the same network connection. R. Peter. 2006 categorize the motivations into intrinsic. and R. enjoyment in helping others. Hervas-Drane. which fits well with the environment of online peer-to-peer networks. The new experiment reveals that individual contribution increases dramatically when peer punishment is enabled. An empirical analysis of network externalities in peer-to-p eer music sharing networks. Kartik Hosanagar. E.e. Proceedings of Twenty-sixth International Conference on Information System. W. individuals in the networks will have less incen tive to reciprocate. Tullberg 2004 . Public Choice 86 1-2 117-135. By punishing or threatening to punish perpetrators who do not comply with social norms. A. Management Information Systems Quarterly 28 1 21-43. M. B. consistent with findings from prior lab experiments. competition. and K. Konana. However. reciprocation of music files provides little value to contributors. Winter-ebmer. J. Journal of Business 59 4 S285?CS300. Besides the factors. we propose: H9: Experience ?C a contributor??s probability of providing priority services to other contributors increases w ith her experience with the peer-to-peer network. It is what one does: why people pa rticipate and help others in electronic communities of practice. a significant difference between the two is the nature of digital goods. Organization Science. therefore. they observe others?? actions in a social network and adjust their behavior accordingl y Bapna et al 2004 . Jayaraman. individuals may have different propensity for reci procity and our regression analysis only reveals the behavior of an average individuals. Second. In the peer-to-peer network studied in this paper. L. L. Science 162 3859 1243-1248. we do not observe rampant fraud in e-commerce environments.
